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Be careful who you vote for.


ghaverkamp

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They have computers in WV now? :)

 

I don't see why people would get all bent out of shape about that. I mean, my old Palm Tungsten got out of whack like that all the time. It happens. Yes, it temporarily messes up their votes, but looking at the calibration process, it was quick and painless (done by a tech) and you've got the on screen confirmations (not to mention the paper record) about it nonetheless.

 

However, there will still be those that don't bother to read whom they voted for and will then complain later that they didn't understand... I probably shouldn't comment on that type of people huh? :)

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I don't see why people would get all bent out of shape about that. I mean, my old Palm Tungsten got out of whack like that all the time. It happens. Yes, it temporarily messes up their votes, but looking at the calibration process, it was quick and painless (done by a tech) and you've got the on screen confirmations (not to mention the paper record) about it nonetheless.

 

I guess the problem was that, even after the machine was supposedly calibrated, it still registered the wrong result -- I'm thinking of the post-calibration straight Republican vote. Clearly, the vendors can't even get calibration right.

 

The problem is much larger, though. There's no way of knowing what's going on in the server-side components of these systems, which have proven about as reliable as their front-ends.

 

This is just indicative of the general lack of care that has gone into these machines, shown time and again.

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They have computers in WV now? :)

 

 

Yes siree, right after e-lectric lights and indoor plumbin'

 

( Don't you go pokin' fun of my kin folk now) :grin:

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"Yes siree, right after e-lectric lights and indoor plumbin' "

And the 8 foot satellite TV antenna... The WV state flower... :grin:

 

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West Virginia's not the only state using ES&S electronic voting systems. Not that it matters if they're solely from ES&S. Formerly Diebold machines (now Premier Election Systems, to try to remove the negative halo from Diebold) have exhibited plenty of problems, as have the Sequioa machines.

 

It's not all touch-screen systems, either. Many areas with optical scan readers have shown inconsistent counts.

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We need to be mindful that, no matter how carefully they are planned, mistakes will happen during an election involving tens of millions of people. Because of this, the United States should simply ban elections so that these senseless mistakes are never made in the first place.

 

It's a small price to pay even if it helps only one person avoid that terrible feeling of failure.

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We need to be mindful that, no matter how carefully they are planned, mistakes will happen during an election involving tens of millions of people. Because of this, the United States should simply ban elections so that these senseless mistakes are never made in the first place.

 

It's a small price to pay even if it helps only one person avoid that terrible feeling of failure.

 

Now that's funny!

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We need to be mindful that, no matter how carefully they are planned, mistakes will happen during an election involving tens of millions of people. Because of this, the United States should simply ban elections so that these senseless mistakes are never made in the first place.

 

It's a small price to pay even if it helps only one person avoid that terrible feeling of failure.

 

Now that's funny!

 

Funny yes, and also sadly true.

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Is Sequoia the new name now that Diebold means junk? I heard they changed their name to avoid the stigma of their first efforts.

 

Greg answered that earlier in the thread.

 

Formerly Diebold machines (now Premier Election Systems, to try to remove the negative halo from Diebold) have exhibited plenty of problems, as have the Sequioa machines
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Is Sequoia the new name now that Diebold means junk? I heard they changed their name to avoid the stigma of their first efforts.

 

They changed the name of the election machines to protect the Diebold brand, which is still stamped on other machines intended to be trustworthy located all over the world: ATMs.

 

After all, it's easy to ask the obvious question. If they can't manufacturer a machine as simple as a voting machine, which only has to display choices on a screen and keep count, how are we possibly expected to trust them manufacturing machines that are to be distributed across a global banking transactions network, counting and dispensing and tracking the flow of billions of dollars in cash?

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Couple hundred voters in my little township, and we always voted on a little square piece of paper. Voting was quick, easy and no waiting. Now we have two touch screen machines and the elderly people can't figure out how to use it, in 2006 the line was a hour and half long. I dread next Tuesday.

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If they can't manufacturer a machine as simple as a voting machine, which only has to display choices on a screen and keep count,

I've always wondered about that. What is it about such an apparently simple function that makes it so challenging to the voting machine vendors?

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If they can't manufacturer a machine as simple as a voting machine, which only has to display choices on a screen and keep count,

I've always wondered about that. What is it about such an apparently simple function that makes it so challenging to the voting machine vendors?

 

From what I can tell, the problem is that simplifying the presentation of a ballot isn't big enough business. The makers of the electronic voting machines were looking to sell a complete package: front-end data collection (voting); intermediate collection (polling place and precinct aggregation); and back-end tabulation and presentation (state or county election committee systems.)

 

In order to sell a package with the plan for it to take over an entire state's election systems and to do it with the money flooding in response to the 2000 fiasco, they had to throw bits together with commodity parts. So, they used off-the-shelf PC bits, with poorly secured communications ports. They used standard communications protocols to talk between the layers. They spit out software in a hurry to handle all of these bits. And they ensured that the review that would be done would be in controlled, benchmark-like conditions.

 

That, combined with the money and muscle to convince elections officials that this is the way to go, and that's all she wrote, until people had time to catch their breath, get their hands on the machines... or in Diebold's case, connect anonymously to their FTP server and download their proprietary source code to see just how bad it was.

 

The irony in all of this is that since Florida in 2000, we've learned that properly maintained punch-card ballot machines are largely infallible. Proper polling place procedures can fix hanging chads, and properly cleaned machines don't induce dimpled chads. What's more, there's a paper trail.

 

When we start introducing an analog-to-digital conversion process, we get what we would expect: signal degradation, sometimes with random, unexpected outcomes. When we then treat vote tallying as somehow less important than oversight of ATMs and slot machines, rolling these systems out without thorough code reviews in a willy-nilly manner, we begin to risk the integrity of our elections.

 

The answer is, the problem shouldn't be that hard. However, the best way to make money off of the problem was to craft a big solution, rather than to produce a directed solution at a well-defined problem.

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When I first started seeing stories like these, of documented vulnerabilities in the machines, I pretty well thought that this was why exit polls showed one thing in 2004 and official results showed another. I did a google search this evening and found that the matter is subject to a great deal of debate. Certainly matters are well outside of my area of expertise or ability to understand. Some say the exit polling was flawed, some say the vote tallying was flawed. I don't know.

 

Considering how different a world we would be in with different results you have to figure that elections are one of the most important exercises a democracy goes through. Some margin of error is surely unavoidable, but given how close recent elections have been you have to figure we need to get the error rate well under 1%, say 0.1% or thereabouts, and restore confidence to the system.

 

Seems we are a very, very long way from that. It is very disappointing and scary. I could see this leading to civil war if confidence is not restored. Seems we should all be able to agree on that, anyway. [Edit] Agree that it is important to restore confidence in the system is what I meant.[/edit]

 

Jan

 

 

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Greg, you are losing sight of that which matters most - The symbolic act of trying. As is the case with most national problems these days, it is not really important whether a course of action ultimately succeeds, but that it was tried.

 

In New America, we place a higher value on the attempt than we do on the result. So, as long as our intentions are good, and that we are making some sort of effort, we need not burden ourselves with the expectation of a successful outcome.

 

With this new measure of success, New America will prosper beyond its wildest dreams.

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Calvin  (no socks)

Steve, In New America I can "Text My Vote" to the candidate of choice and then watch the outcome later on when I have time to catch up on things that take a backseat to my hectic schedule. Multiple "Texts" would be frowned upon, and infractions would require counseling by a group of reformed offenders. This technology has been perfected and endorsed by Ryan Seacrest. I'll bet we double the count/interest at the "New Election Show" and every one with a phone can vote. Text early, Text often! Good luck.

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Somehow my Diebold machine didn't explode or vote for someone I didn't select. And yes, I read both the on-screen and printed copies.

 

Weird. I didn't see that coming. :)

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Somehow my Diebold machine didn't explode or vote for someone I didn't select. And yes, I read both the on-screen and printed copies.

 

All that matters is what the centralized tabulation systems record, and that doesn't appear on what comes out of the machine.

 

At least if there's a way to determine that there might be a problem, there's a way to do a recount. (Though if you saw "Hacking Democracy", you know that they don't go to the paper trail; they just do a new collection from the machines.)

 

We had a Sequioa optical scan machine. I would have liked to have received an actual paper receipt telling me how it thinks I voted.

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  • 3 weeks later...

We had a great system at our polling location. You filled out a paper ballot by darkening the circles (BIG). Then you inserted it into a scanner slot (like a dollar bill changer) in front of the election judge. If it aceepted it the machine tabulated your votes and dropped it into an iron safe. If it was rejected you check your darkening efforts. It eliminated all of the terminals and having to train the voters.

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